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BAR BRIEFS
THE DISPOSITION BY WILL OF ONE'S BODY AFTER DEATH
For centuries it has been a common practice for persons to give
directions in their wills for the disposition of their bodies after
death. These provisions have been universally respected when
consonant with custom and the established rules of law.' The first
known instance of the testamentary disposition of a corpse has
been found in the will of Lycon, a peripatetic Greek philosopher
who lived in the third century B. C.' A provision of his will stated
that his body should be burned. In 1397, John of Gaunt directed
that his body be buried in St. Paul's Cathedral Church "and that it
be not buried for forty days during which I charge my executors
that there be no cering or embalming of my corpse."' Similarly,
William Pelham of Kent bequeathed his body in 1532, "to be
buried in the chauncel of Laughton."' In a more recent period
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1833), the famous English philosopher
and jurist, bequeathed his body for dissection.' In the early hisIn 1643,
tory of the United States we find similar provisions.
Moses Paine of Baintree, Massachusetts, provided: "My bodie to
be buried wheresoever it shall please God to call me, at the discretion of my sonne Moses whom I make mine executor." Comfort
Starr, in 1660, directed by his will: "I commend and comit my
soule into the hands of Almighty God ...my body to ye earth fro
whence it came to be burryed, within ye usuall place of buriall in
Boston, so nere my Late wife as may be possible with conveniency."
Although provisions of this nature have been included in wills
from time immemmorial, and such provisions have been respected
by those upon whom the duty of burial devolved, nevertheless the
courts have generally refused to extend enforcement to bequests
of such kind. Foremost among the reasons for refusing compliance with the testator's wishes is the common law theory that
there is no property in a dead body. Although the problem of
willing one's dead body is inextricably involved in this property
concept, it is also influenced by religious beliefs and public policy.
In Coke's Institutes we find early common law authority for
the proposition that there are no property rights in a dead body.
Coke has cited the case of one William Hain for this proposition.
The defendant in that action had been indicted for digging up the
graves of several men and women, taking away their burial sheets,
and re-burying the bodies. At the assizes at Leicester, in Lent,
Anno. 10 Jac., the court reached the conclusion that the property
of the burying sheets was in the executors of the deceased for the
dead body is not capable of any property, and the property of the
sheets must be in some one.' From this proposition it was decided
at the common law that the burial sheets and clothes, the tomb,
and the monument, as well as the burial lot, were the property of
'Frank W. Grlnnell, "Legal Rights in the Remains of the Deads," The Green Bag
(Boston, 1905,) XVII, p. 345.
Francis Kind Carey, "The disposition of the Body After Death." American Law
Review (St. Louis, 1885), XIX, p. 256.
Grinnell, op. cit.
* Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
3 Coke's Institutes, 110.

BAR BRIEFS
the executors and administrators, or other owners of them, but no
one had an interest in the dead body. For an interference with
the rights in such property, the courts gave a cause of action to
the owner thereof, but as to the body, there was no legal rights.
As Coke said:
"It is to be observed, that in every sepulcher, that hath a monument, two things are to be considered, viz. the monument, and the sepulture or buriall of the dead. The buriall of the cadaver (that is caro
data vermibus [flesh given to worms]) is mullius in bonis, and belongs
to ecclesiasticall cognisance, but as to the monument, action is given
(as hath been said) at the common law for defacing thereof."'

These propositions were reaffirmed in Blackstone's Commentaries when he wrote the following paragraph:
"But though the heir has a property in the monuments and
escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes;
nor can he bring any civil action against such as indecently at least, if
not impiously, violate and disturb their remains, when dead and buried.
The parson, indeed, who has the freehold of the soil, may bring an
action of trespass against such as dig and disturb it; and if any one in
taking up a dead body steals the shroud or other apparel, it will be
felony; for the property therein remains in the executor, or whoever
was at the charge of the funeral.'

In the Commentaries it Is also noted that the family and owners of the burial lot might by joint action enjoin unlawful interference with the body. The action, however, would be predicated
upon the injury to the lot or to the burial clothes, and not upon
the theory of any injury to the dead body as such. However, it
was said that the injured feelings of the family might be taken
into consideration in such actions in awarding damages for such
interference."
W. S. Holdsworth, in his History of English Law, has attempted to explain why there was developed, in the common law, the
theory that there was no larceny of a dead body." He pointed out
that there was a heterogeneous list of things which could not be
stolen. Among these were dead bodies. Three main principles
were cited as fundamental in the formation of this view point.
First it was pointed out that larceny was based upon the idea of
taking, and carrying away property; secondly, that there could be
no larceny of things which are not property because of the facts
that they had no value; thirdly, that the stolen thing must have
an owner. At common law, no one could see any value in a dead
body, and since there was no value in the body, there was no need
for an owner. So, until the development of the theory of the value
of a dead body, it was incomprehensible that it be considered property, and by the time it was realized that there was value in a dead
body, the principle that a dead body was not property was imbedded firmly into the law and public policy.
It was not until the rise of medical science that dead bodies assumed a peculiar value. A corpse became extremely valuable, and,
S Ibid., 203.
2 Blackstone's Commentaries, Sec. 429 (Lewis' Edition). p. 887.
10Ibid.
n W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Boston, 1923), IIIp. 367.
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unlawfully, a great deal of traffic in dead bodies was carried on.
Probably the most notorious dealers in dead bodies were two Irishmen by the names of Burke and Hare. To secure a supply of dead
bodies to fill the demands of anatomical science, these men waylaid
and murdered persons, and sold their bodies to medical schools.'
These men became so notorious that the verb "to burke" was
adopted by the English language. Webster's dictionary gives this
definition:
"After William Burke of Edinburgh, executed for the crime in
1829. 1. To murder by sucocation, or with few marks of violence, in
order to obtain a body to be sold for dissection. 2. To dispose of
quietly or indirectly;
l to suppress; to smother, as to burke a parliamentary question.'"'

It is interesting to note that after Burke was executed for the
crime in 1829, his body was given to the Medical School of the
University of Edinburgh for dissection, and his skeleton has hung
there ever since.
Traffic of this sort has flourished intermittently since that
time. Late in the nineteenth century a professor of anatomy at
Jefferson College was arraigned before Criminal Court in Philadelphia on the charge of being a party to the wholesale robbery of
a negro graveyard." Body snatching for such purposes has often
been resorted to when the supply cannot satisfy the demand. It
is undoubtedly one of the leading factors in the formation of public policy against the extension of rights in and to dead bodies, although at the same time, the need of dead bodies by medical
schools for the welfare of humanity has influenced reformers to
condemn a rigid adherence to common law principles.
Aside from the common law theory that there is no property
in a dead body, other factors have influenced the right of one to
dispose of his body by will. Since ancient times both great respect and great fear have been shown for the corpse. The religious
ideas of the future life and of the resurrection of the body are
stamped upon the burial ceremony, and it has been considered sacrilegious to permit one so to dispose of his body. The health factor, too, has played an important role, but it has been subordinated
to superstitious notions concerning the dead." However, these
conceptions are cited as historical, and should not be considered as
controlling in modern society. The fear of the corpse has descended from superstitious notions, and is generally felt to be outmoded. Modern religion recognizes anatomical research after
death, and generally recognizes that it has no bearing upon the
after life. Finally, the regulation by modern health laws concerning dead bodies, renders this factor unimportant. Until modern
times, however, these factors have greatly influenced public opinion.
By the time of the American Revolution the English Common
Law in regard to property rights in a dead body was generally
In re Johnson's Estate. 169 Misc. 215, 7 N.Y.S. (2d), 81, at p. 86 (1938).
webster's New International Dictionary (Springfield. Mass., 1943).
carey. op. cit.. 253.
Ibid.. 257.
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adopted in this country. It was not a felony to steal a corpse, but
it was to steal the shroud or the coffin. It was a misdemeanor, as
a public nuisance only, to remove a dead body from the grave. The
persons owning the burial lot or the monuments or tombs could
maintain an action of trespass for interference therewith. However, in other aspects, the only laws meting out punishment to
those defiling the dead body itself were ecclesiastical courts or
local church parishes" both in this country and in England. As
for the supply of corpses for the dissecting room, statutes provided for them by dedicating the bodies of certain classes of criminals
for that purpose, as had the Anotomy Act of 18332 in England. The
English case of Rex V. Lyons" has been cited as the basis for subsequent English and American statutes making it a misdemeanor
to disturb the remains of the dead. The defendant in that action
had robbed a grave of its contents for the purpose of dissection.
The court, in finding the defendant guilty of the crime charged
stated, "Common decency requires that this practice shall be put
to a stop. The offense is cognizable at common law as being
highly indecent and contra bonos mores; at the bare idea of which
nature revolts." After the revolution the ecclesiastical courts
were abolished, leaving the common law courts with their narrow
authority to protect the dead.
Upon the question of property rights in dead bodies from the
viewpoint of the criminal law, apart from specific statutes, the
prevailing viewpoint is today the same as it was at the time of
Coke's Institutes. There is no property in a dead body, and it cannot be the subject of larceny." Furthermore, it has been said that
neither a body living or dead is property within the meaning of
the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution." These references are made because of the fact that the courts have been unable to divorce the common law theory that there is no property
in a dead body from the question of disposal by will.
Aside from the common law doctrine that there is no property
in a dead body, the law has had to recognize the fact that the duty
of burial falls upon someone. The general weight of authority
places a duty upon the executor or administrator to keep the body
in his custody until burial, but he has no right to it, nor has he a
right to the disposition of the remains of the deceased." In the
absence of unfitness and in the absence of express wishes of the
deceased, the following are the general rules naming those upon
whom the duty of burial falls. The husband and wife have the
duty of burying one another. If there is no surviving husband or
wife, the living children have the duty as they naturally come
next. In the absence of children the duty devolves upon the parents or the grandchildren of the decedent, and after them, the
brothers and sisters of the deceased."
" Ibid.. 261.
" Rex v. Lyons, 2 Term Rep. 733; cited in Carey, op cit., 260.
" Francis Wharton, Criminal Law (Rochester, N. Y., 1932) )12th Ed.) nIp.1411.
0 Frank Hall Childs, Principles of Personal Property (Chicago,

1914), p.

124.

See

also, William Fryer, Readings on Personal Property (St. Paul, 1938, Ch. I).

" 17 C. J. 1139, Sec. 3; 25 C. J. S. 1017, See. 3.

n Ibid.
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These general rules are closely related to the law of North
Dakota pertaining to the duty of burial.' In North Dakota the
duty of burial devolves upon the following persons: First, if the
deceased was married, then upon the surviving spouse; secondly,
if the deceased was not married but left kindred, upon the person
or persons in the same degrees, of adult age, nearest of kin to the
deceased living within the state and possessed of sufficient means
to defray the expense of burial; thirdly, if an inquest is held and
there is no husband or wife and no kindred, then the duty falls
upon the coroner; lastly, it is provided that if the person so designated by law to bury the body fails to do so within the time specified by law, the duty shall devolve upon the next person so specified. These persons so designated are alone entitled to the custody of the body, aside from the custody of undertakers, coroners,
and medical schools."
With the recognition of these classes of persons upon whom
the duty of burial devolves, and who are given the legal custody
of the body pending disposal, the question arose as to the rights
of such persons to the body. Do they have absolute rights in the
body, or were the rules developed for convenience only? Could a
testator designate persons other than those found in the laws to
dispose of his remains? If he might do so, would his wishes be
carried out in spite of objections from his kindred? One of the
earliest cases upon the subject was the case of Regina v. Fox, decided in 1841." One Foster had been imprisoned for debt, and died
while in jail. By his will he had appointed two executors who,
after his death, demanded the body. An inquest was held after
the death, and the coroner ordered the remains buried in the jal
yard. The executors again demanded the body, and applied to
Scott, the jailer, and Fox, the lord of the manor, for the body.
Scott refused to deliver the body to the executors, unless they
paid him certain sums he claimed from the deceased as due himself for articles supplied to Foster. The executors refused to pay
the sum, and Scott threatened to inter the body within the jail
yard. A mandamus was then issued to show cause why an attachment should not issue. Without deciding that the executors
had a right to the dead body, Scott was indicted and convicted of
Almisconduct in his public office on petition by the executors.'
though it was not decided that the executors had a right to the
body, and the body was not delivered up to them, the law recognized that the jailer had interefered with their duty, and in so doing was guilty of misconduct.
In the case of Regina v. Sharpe decided in 1857, the court held
that although the law recognizes a right devolving upon the children to bury their deceased parent, the law does not recognize the
right of any one particular child to the exclusion of his brothers or
sisters." In that case the defendant's family belonged to a congregation of dissenters, and his mother had been buried in the
N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 23-0603.
= Ibid., Secs.23-0602,23-0613,26-0614.
"

"
'

Regina v. Fox, 2 Q.B. 246, 114 Ong. Rep. 95 (1841).
Regina v. Scott, 2 Q.B. 248. 114 Eng. Rep. 97 (1841).
Regina v. Sharpe, Dears and Bell. Cr. Cases, 160; 169 Eng. Rep. 959 (1857).
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cemetry of such dissenting church with the consent of the other
members of the family. The defendant had fraudulently secured
the key to the burying ground, opened the grave and removed the
coffin of his mother. In so doing he had also disturbed the graves
of his step-mother and two children. The defendant was found
guilty of trespass, and the court said:
"We have considered the grounds relied on in that behalf [as to his
personal desire to secure his mother's coffin], and, although we are
fully sensible of the estimable motives on which the defendant acted,
namely, filial affection and religious duty, still neither authority nor
principle would justify the position that the wrongful removal of a
corpse was no misdemeanor if the motive for the act deserved approbation.
"A purpose of anatemical science would fall within that category.
Neither does the law recognize the right of any one child to the corpse
of its parent as claimed by the defendant."

The court specifically pointed out that it had reached such a
conclusion because of the fact that there was no property right in
a dead body.
The case of Williams v. Williams, decided in 1882, is the leading case upon the subject of the right to dispose of one's dead body
by will in England.' It has also formed the basis for the cases in
the United States which deny the right. In this case the testator
directed by his will that his body be delivered to Miss Williams
(who was not one of the executors) and that she transport his
body to Milan for cremation. In spite of the provision the executors had the body buried in Brompton Cemetery. Miss Williams then attempted to secure permission to remove the body, so
as to carry out the testator's wishes, but it was denied. She then
secured a license from the Home Secretary to remove the body to
another cemetery. In fraud of the license she had the body
transported to Milan and cremated. Upon her return she brought
this action against the executors as defendants for the cost of
transporting the body to Milan and the cost of cremation. The
court denied her recovery. It was pointed out that the executors
had a right to the custody and possession of the body, although
they had no property in it, until it was properly buried. When the
body was buried, it then became a part of the soil. The court then
stated that it necessarily follows that since there is no property in
a dead body, one cannot dispose of it by will. Therefore, the conclusion was reached that since the direction to Miss Williams was
void in point of law, it gave her no property in the body, nor any
right which she could have enforced against the executors to
compel delivery prior to burial.
Although the case is authority for a great body of subsequent
decisions, there are several controlling principles which may have
influenced the court's decision aside from the common law theory
that there is no property in a dead body. In the first place, at the
time the action was brought the deceased had already been buried.
He was a member of the Roman Catholic faith and had already received his last rites. Therefore, to disinter the body for the purWilliams v. Williams, 20 Ch. Div. 659 (1882).
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pose of cremation would interfere with the religious views and
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, the action
was begun in 1882. Atlhough the court did not discuss the question of cremation, such practice was generally not considered of
the best public policy until the Cremation Act of 1902. The court
did say that a man may direct the manner or place of his burial,
but was silent upon how such provisions might be respected. Finally, Williams v. Williams has been severally criticized as an authority for holding that a man may not dispose of his body by will.
That decision was based on the fact that Miss Williams acted in
fraud upon her license and was denied recovery on that ground,
and that part of the decision pertaining to the disposition of one's
body by will should be considered obiter dictum.
As has been shown, Williams v. Williams formed the basis for
a considerable amount of law in this country. However, there
is considerbale authority to the contrary that although there is no
property in a dead body, there is a quasi property interest which
the courts will protect, and that therefore, a man may dispose of
his remains by will. The case of Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan
Point Cemetery decided in 1872 recognized this quasi property interest and held that the persons having charge of a dead body hold
it as a trust which the court of equity would enforce." The court
said:
... We may consider it [the body] as a sort of quasi property to
which certain persons have rights, as they have duties to perform towards it, arising out of our common humanity. But the person having
charge of it cannot be considered as the owner of it in any sense whatsoever. He holds it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all who
may, from family or friendship, have an interest in it."

In the case of O'Donnell v. Slack, decided in 1890, the California Supreme Court held that neither the executor nor the probate court had any right, as against the widow, to control the disposition of the remains of the petitioner's deceased husband, and
annulled an order of the probate court which intrusted the body
of the deceased to a stranger for the purpose of burial.' The court
held that the right to bury a corpse and to preserve its remains is
a legal right, which the courts of law will recognize and protect.
Such a right, in the absence of any testamentary disposition, belongs exclusively to the next of kin. In so holding the California
court adopted the theory of Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point
Cemetery in its entirety. However, in spite of the decision, the
California court held in Enos v. Snyder two years later that a man
could not dispose of his dead body by will.' In reaching this conclusion the court stated that the point was not involved in 0'Donnell v. Slack and the latter was not controlling. Instead the
court placed full emphasis on the force and effect of the decision
in Williams v. Williams, and overlooked the point that the main
issue was not squarely involved in that case either. As a result
Enos v. Snyder has been often cited as controlling authority for
the proposition that one may not dispose of his body by will. The
court did feel, however, that the defect could easily be remedied
by specific statute.
Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 667 (1872).
, O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285. 55 Pac. 906, 43 L. R. A. 388 (1899).
30 Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac. 170, 82 Am. St. Rep. 330, 53 L. R. A. 221 (1901).
26
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In Pettigrew v. Pettigrew the court stated, "How far the decedent's own wishes, or even his specific directions are to prevail,
must be regarded as unsettled." The court pointed out how in
England a man cannot dispose of his body by will, and then stated,
"The clear trend of the American decisions, is to the contrary, notwithstanding the apparent assent in Enos v. Snyder..."'
In the northwest, the only case in point on the subject is found
in Larson v. Chase." In that case the court said:
". . . we think the general tendency of the courts is to hold that,
in the absence of testamentary disposition, the right of the surviving
wife... is paramount to that of next of kin.
"But whatever may have been the rule in England under the
ecclesiastical law, and while it may be true still that a dead body is not
property in the common commercial sense of that term, yet in this
country it is, so far as we know, universally held that those who are
entitled to possession and custody of it for purposes of decent burial
have certain legal rights to and in it which the law recognizes and will
protect. Indeed the mere fact that a person has exclusive rights over
a body for purposes of burial, leads necessarily to the conclusion that it
is his property in the broadest and most general sense of that term, viz.
something over which the law accords him exclusive control."

Therefore, it is felt that in spite of statutory laws upon the
subject a person has the right to control the disposition of his
body by will. Although it is true that there are no property rights
in a dead body, that proposition does not exclude the theory that
there are some enforceable rights in a dead body. If there are enforceable rights, which the aforementioned cases support, then
the courts should go one step further and permit the testator himself to declare what those enforceable rights will be. In his article
in 1905 Green Bag, Frank W. Grinnell reached the conclusion that
it is the general weight of authority in the United States that a
testator may dispose of his body by will."
It will be noted from the cases previously cited that the courts
of this country have felt that the question of the disposition of
the dead body by will may be given effect and controlled by statute. The case of Enos v. Snyder which denied the right completely on the basis of Williams v. Williams made an express
statement to that effect. However, when disposition is permitted
by will, the question arises as to its limits. Will the provision
stand in court upon objection by the one upon whom the legal custody and duty of burial would devolve in absence of such direction?
The laws of North Dakota contain such a provision as to the
right to dispose of one's own body.' However, it has never been
judicially construed. It provides that, "Subject to the health regulations contained in this chapter, every person has the right to
direct the manner in which his body shall be disposed of after his
death and to direct the manner in which any part of his body
which becomes separated therefrom during his lifetime shall be
disposed of." Again, as evidence of how far the deceased's wishes
0 Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 Ail. 878, 99 Am. St. Rep. 795. 64 L. R. A. 179
at p. 181 (1904).
, Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238, 14 L. R. A. 85 (1891).
, Grinnell, op. cit., 352.
" N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 26-0601.
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should control, we find that in section 23-0602 dissection is allowed (4) "when permission has been given therfore by deceased."
Perhaps the most modern leading case upon this phase of the
law is In re Johnson's Estate, decided in 1938.' The New York
statute contained a provision relating to the right of disposal of
one's own body after death identical with section 26-0601 of the
North Dakota Revised Code (1943). In that case a will was admitted for probate which contained the following provision:
"I, Margaret K. Johnson (wife of Merle De Vore Johnson) being
of sound mind and in full possession of my senses, and for no thought
of remuneration but purely out of the largeneis of my heart and a keen
desire to help, if possible, the cause of Science, do hereby bequeath my
body for the purposes of medical research. Such research is to be conducted under the direction, either jointly or singly, of James A.
Corscaden, M. D., and Hugh Auchincloss, M. D., at present both of the
city of New York and the Harkness Pavilion. It is my wish that my
body be cremated in the simplest form and without grass."

After a thorough review of the law of dead bodies the court
stated, "Since the directions contravene no statute and are consistent with the proprieties there is no reason why the directions
may not be given effect. Specifically there is no reason why the instrument may not be probated as a means of giving effect to her
wishes."
This case was cited as binding authority in the case of In re
Scheck's Estate." In that case the petitioners were next of kin
who were objecting to the cost involved in carrying out the testator's wishes. In their attempt to overthrow the provision, they
introduced evidence to the effect that the will was not a true expression of the decendent's last wisheq. The court said that "reversal of the formally expressed wishes of this decedent respecting disposal of her remains is permissible only upon a clear and
convincing demonstration by competent and credible testimony,
that such was in fact her desire."
In re Eichner's Estate concerned directly the proposition that
the provision of the testator's will relating to the disposal of his
own body should be carried out in spite of objections from those
upon whom the right of burial would have devolved but for the
will." After citing In re Johnson's Estate, the court stated: "The
desire of the testator must be given effect. In view of the plain
duty of the executors under the statute and decisions, the opposition of other members of the family to cremation is without legal
support or other force."
Therefore, it is seen that by modern authority one may dispose
of his own body after death by will, and such wish of a testator
will be upheld in spite of protest from his family or next of kin.
The weight of authority in the United States upholds a quasi
property interest in the one who is entitled to the legal custody of
the dead body which will be upheld so far as practicable. The law,
however, still does not recognize a property right in a dead body
In re Johnson's Estate, 169 Misc. 215, 7 N.Y.S. (2d) 81 (1938).
N In re Scheck's Estate. 172 Misc. 236, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 946 (1939).
v In re Eichner's Estate, 173 Misc. 573, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 573 (1940). See also, In re
Herskovits. 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 906 (1944); In re Harlam, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 103
(1945).
"
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in the ordinary commercial sense of the term. Since there is no
property in a dead body, there can be no valid contract to sell one's
body, nor to enter a binding contract to make a will disposing of
one's dead body for a specific purpose because of lack of consider-'
ation. As has been pointed out, one may will his remains to a
medical school, but since there is no property in the body, he could
not enter into a binding contract for a remuneration therefor. One
wishing to secure a body for such purpose would not be safe in
extending money during the lifetime of the testator in return for
a bequest in the will, for until the testator's death the will is ambulatory and may be revoked at any time. Therefore, although
one may now dispose of his body by will, there is no reason why
it should be deemed in conflict with public policy, or why it should
give rise to any traffic in dead bodies.
Walter H. Lorshbough
Third Year Law Student.
ATTORNEYS WANTED
The American Bar Association has received a request from
the Department of State for assistance in the selection of attorneys to serve as "Military Government Court Officers" in Germany. This letter is addressed to you in compliance with that request and in the belief that you can be of assistance. I suggest
that, if you know of any qualified men who might be interested,
you acquaint them with the contents of this letter and ask them
to communicate with:
Boyd Fisher, Recruitment Officer
Department of State
2049 Munitions Building
Washington 25, D. C.
The general requirements and duties of this assignment and
the compensation incident thereto have been outlined to us, as
follows:
Acceptance of the assignment will necessitate leaving family
and commitments here for a year and serving under military leadership in circumstances alien to the experience of established men
of the bar. The prestige of the United States rules out any candidates without a high-grade legal education, a broad background
in or with a good firm, considerable forensic experience, totaling
not less than from three to five years, possibly some civic experience, and certainly inherent qualities pointing to the candidate's
capacity to uphold the honor and competence of the American Bar
in a wholly unusual setting.
The duties of the assignment will include service at various
times as judge or prosecutor in military government courts;
preparation of opinions and advice to superiors on military government and German and International Law; making recommendations on proposed German legislation, and reviewing cases already
heard in military government courts. Knowledge of German
would be desired, but is not requisite.
The salary is based on $6,230 per annum, with 25% added for
overseas maintenance, totaling around $7,787. The Army fur-

